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Introduction 
Most creative outputs are readily classified as belonging to a particular domain 
such as art, music, or technology. But does that mean the creative thinking that goes into 
creative projects respects these conventional domain boundaries? This question provides 
the departure point for this chapter. It is an important question because the answer has 
implications for how the creative process works, as well as for computational models of 
creativity, and thus it provides the departure point for this chapter. Next we look at how 
the creator sifts out from its vast contents those items to incorporate into a creative 
project, and converts these raw materials into a form that “gels” with the project. We then 
explore the hypothesis that the creative mind forges “mental wormholes” that connect 
concepts and percepts, often from seemingly disparate domains. Finally, we take a brief 
look at the strangely non-compositional interactions that take place in these mental 
wormholes, and techniques being advanced to model and understand these interactions. 
 
Does Creative Thought Respect Domain Boundaries? 
I remember as a child placing everything in the world into categories such as 
“things that don’t change” (e.g., a rock), “things that go back and forth between two 
possibilities” (e.g., a metronome), “things that circle around to their starting point” (e.g., 
seasons, or music that always goes back to the chorus), things that spiral around to a 
slightly different starting point” (e.g., music that is transposed to a different key before 
returning to the chorus, or a story in which the character changes before returning home), 
and so forth. Whether a pattern was implemented as musical notes versus words on a 
page seemed superficial compared to the fact that they were both instances of, say, 
“spiral”. Amazingly enough, the adults in my life didn’t see this as a profound and useful 
way of carving up reality. 
Of course, reality doesn’t come carved up into domains. However, since we all 
come into this world equipped with sensory apparatuses that parse information in specific 
ways, and we are educated in ways that reinforce the categorization of knowledge into 
specific domains (mathematics, music, art, and so forth), it is natural that we come to 
accept these domains as real, or at least as pragmatically useful social constructs. But that 
doesn’t mean that they necessarily reflect how we think. There is evidence that people do 
not think in ways that respect conventional domain boundaries (e.g., musical thought is 
not restricted to concepts such as rhythm and timbre) . Ingredients for creative thinking 
such as remote associates (e.g., “cottage” and “cheese”) (Mednick, 1962), analogies 
(Gentner, 1983), ‘seed incidents’ (e.g., falling in love inspires a song) (Doyle, 1998), and 
inspirational sources often come from beyond the problem domain. For example, in one 
study, 66 creative individuals in a variety of disciplines were asked to list as many 
influences on their creative work as they could (Gabora & Carbert, 2015). Rather 
astonishingly, not only were cross-domain influences found to exist, they more 
widespread than within-domain influences (Table 1). Moreover, this was the case even 
when not just narrow within-domain influences (e.g., painter influenced by paintings) but 
also broad within-domain influences (e.g., painter influenced by Spirograph toy) are 
classified as “within-domain influences”.  
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Table 1: Number of participants in each creative domain (N), and the raw number (r) and 
percentage (%) of influences that were cross-domain (CD), within-domain: narrow (WD-n), 
within-domain: broad (WD-b, and uncertain (U). Percentages are in brackets. A dash indicates 
that no examples were present in the data. (From Gabora & Carbert, 2015). 
 
Creative  N CD WD-n WD-b U 
Domain  r (%) r (%)    r (%)    r (%) 
Painting 44 21 (48) 12 (27)    4  (9)    6 (14) 
Drawing  8  2 (25)  2 (25) – –    3 (38) 
Photography  4  2 (50) – –    1 (25) – – 
Sculpture  5  3 (60) – – – –    1 (20) 
Music  3  1 (33)  2 (68) – –    1 (33) 
Writing  2  2 (100)  1 (50) – –    1 (50) 
TOTAL 66 31 (47) 17 (27)    5  (8) 12 (18) 
 
These results suggest that even when a particular creative output is categorized as 
belonging to a single domain (e.g., a painting belongs to the domain of art), the thinking 
that went into it may well have spanned many domains. In fact, analysis of the data 
suggested that just about anything encoded in memory can potentially be recruited into a 
creative thought process.  
So a first point to be made about the inner workings of creative thought is that it 
can incorporate ingredients from beyond the domain in which it will eventually be 
expressed. This leads to two questions. First, how does the creator sift out from its vast 
contents those items to incorporate into a given creative thought process? Second, how 
does it convert this raw material into a form that is amenable to re-expression in a 
different domain? 
 
Aware-Restructure-Express (ARE) 
Possible answers to these questions are suggested by a number of theories of 
creativity, including the honing theory of creativity (Carbert, Gabora, Schwartz, & 
Ranjan, 2014; Gabora, 2005, 2010a, in prep.). The basic idea is as follows. The creative 
mind is perpetually on the lookout for arenas of creative potential or incomplete 
understanding that Torrance (1962) refers to as the gap. The gap is arousal-inducing 
(where arousal may be either positively or negatively valenced). The creative process 
involves sequentially considering this gap from different perspectives, at different levels 
of detail, such that arousal dissipates. The new perspectives (1) restructure information 
(radically or imperceptibly) in the region of the gap, and (2) suggests a subsequent 
perspective to look at it from. The finding of new perspectives may be facilitated by 
shifting to an associative mode of thought, such that cell assemblies that respond to not 
just central but also peripheral features of the task are recruited. Since these cell 
assemblies may previously have encoded memories related to the task but in an atypical 
way, they can be the gateway to creative solutions (Gabora, 2002, 2010a). Eventually the 
new perspectives have restructured task-related ideas to the extent that they exhibit an 
acceptable level of consistency (Gabora, 1999), arousal decreases, and the creative 
outcome is expressed.  
We can refer to this process of becoming aware of an arousal-inducing gap, 
sequentially restructuring it, and expressing it in restructured form, as the Aware-
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Restructure-Express process, or ARE. Note that domain-specific operations are in service 
of ARE; for example, one goes through the motions of committing paint to a canvas or 
words to page due to the arousing effect of the sense of incomplete understanding or 
creative potential. Findings that creativity can be intrinsically rewarding (Gruber, 1995; 
Kounios & Beeman, 2014; Martindale, 1984), and therapeutic (Barron, 1963; Forgeard, 
2013), and that high levels of creativity are correlated with positive affect (Hennessey & 
Amabile, 2010) suggest that one may be further motivated by anticipation of the pleasant 
and perhaps even therapeutic impact of the creative process. 
 
Implications for Whether Creativity is Domain-Specific or Domain-General 
The apparent domain-specificity of creativity—the fact that those who are 
eminently creative in one domain are unlikely to be eminently creative in another—may 
be an artifact of our focus on the external outcome of creative thinking, i.e., the product. 
When we focus instead on the internally transformative effects of creativity it appears to 
be much more domain-general; many if not most individuals have multiple avenues for 
transformative self-expression. This is particularly the case when we consider the creative 
aspects of activities that are not prototypically creative, such as organizing parties, fixing 
household appliances, or even, deceiving others. 
There is evidence that when people express themselves creatively in different 
domains their creative outputs bear the same recognizable distinctive style or ‘voice’ 
(Gabora, 2010; Gabora, O’Connor, & Ranjan, 2012; Ranjan, 2014). In one study, art 
students were able to identify at significantly above-chance levels which famous artists 
created pieces of art they had not seen before, as well as which of their classmates created 
pieces of art they had not seen before. More surprisingly, art students also identified the 
creators of non-painting artworks that they had not seen before. Similarly, creative 
writing students were able to identify at significantly above-chance levels passages of 
text written by famous writers that they had not encountered before, and passages of text 
written by their classmates that they had not encountered before. Perhaps most surprising, 
creative writing students also identified at significantly above-chance levels which of 
their classmates created a work of art, i.e., a creative work in a domain other than writing. 
The finding that creative style is recognizable across domains is incompatible with the 
view that creativity is domain-specific. 
Not only does a creator’s personal style come through in different domains, but an 
inspirational source leaves a recognizable trace on a creative work in a different domain. 
In a study in which pieces of music were re-interpreted as paintings, naïve participants 
were able to correctly identify at significantly above chance which piece of music 
inspired which painting (Ranjan, Gabora, & O’Connor, 2014; Ranjan, 2014). Although 
the medium of expression is different, something of its essence remains sufficiently intact 
for an observer to detect a resemblance between the new work and the source that 
inspired it. These results lend empirical support to the largely anecdotal body of evidence 
that cross-domain influence is a genuine phenomenon, and suggested that, at their core, 
creative ideas are less domain-dependent than they are generally assumed to be. 
 
Mental Wormholes 
Creativity is often said to involve forging new associations amongst concepts and 
percepts (Ward, Smith, & Vaid, 1997). Thus percepts and concepts are the building 
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blocks from which creative ideas are generated. A percept is a mental impression of 
something perceived by the senses, such as the sight of a particular kitchen. We often 
interpret percepts in terms of related percepts we have encountered in the past, i.e., we 
spontaneously categorize a particular kitchen as an instance of the concept KITCHEN. A 
concept is a mental construct that enables us to interpret the present situation in terms of 
similar previous situations. Concepts can be concrete, like KITCHEN, or abstract, like 
VIRTUE. Although concepts have traditionally been viewed as internal structures that 
represent a class of entities in the world, increasingly they are thought to have no fixed 
representational structure, their structure being dynamically influenced by the contexts in 
which they arise (Hampton, 1997). For example, you might consider the concept 
KITCHEN in the context of a doll house, in which case it is tiny.  
We can use the tem mental wormholes to refer to interactions between percepts 
and concepts from different domains, as schematically illustrated in Figure One. Since 
these interactions lie at the heart of the creative act, let us examine them more closely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of three mental wormholes, indicated by curved red lines, 
connecting concepts in one domain to concepts in another. See text for explanation.  
 
The Strikingly Non-compositional Manner in which Concepts and Percepts Interact 
Strange things happen in mental wormholes. Concepts and percepts interact with 
each other in an almost chameleon-like manner, spontaneously transmuting to match their 
surroundings, or context. Thus a context can alters sometimes dramatically, how you 
experience a concept (Barsalou, 1999). Even more strangely, they often interact in ways 
that are non-compositional; in other words, that violate the rules of classical logic. For 
example, although people do not rate ‘guppy’ as a typical PET, nor as a typical FISH, 
they rate it as a highly typical PET FISH (Osherson & Smith, 1981). Something happens 
when the concepts PET and FISH interact that cannot be formally described using any 
kind of logical—or even fuzzy logical—function of the typicalities of pets and fish. Not 
every combination of percepts or concepts exhibits noncompositionality, but the 
phenomenon is widespread (Storms, De Boeck, Van Mechelen, & Ruts, 1998). Moreover, 
people not only prefer combinations that interact noncompositionally over those that 
interact in a straightforward additive manner, but find them more creative (Gibbert, 
Hampton, Estes, & Mazursky, 2012). 
mathematics 
music 
art 
… 
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Emergent Properties and Incorporation of Outside Knowledge 
One spectacular manifestation of non-compositionality observed when percepts and 
concepts interact is the birth of new emergent properties. For example, although people 
do not rate ‘talks’ as a characteristic property of PET or BIRD, they rate it as a 
characteristic property of PET BIRD. ‘Talks’ it is not a property of either constituent 
concept; it is an emergent property of the combined concept. A combined concept may 
also exhibit a loss of properties typical of one or both constituents. For example, 
‘surrounded by water’, a seemingly central property of ISLAND, is (hopefully) not 
present in instances of KITCHEN ISLAND. 
A related phenomenon is that concept combinations often incorporate world 
knowledge that goes beyond the constituent concepts themselves (Fodor, 1998; Hampton, 
1987). For example, consider the concept TEAPOT, which presumably came about by 
taking a known object, a pot, and adapting it to be used for liquid. The combining of 
these concepts gave birth to a new concept, the idea of a spout. Moreover, this process 
employed knowledge of gravity and fluid dynamics that extends beyond the properties 
and instances of TEA and POT. 
 
Entanglement and Interference 
 How are we to understand the interactions between percepts and concepts at the 
core of the creative process when we cannot even describe these interactions with 
standard mathematics? There is in fact a branch of mathematics that is well suited to 
describing highly contextual interactions. It was first used in quantum mechanics, but 
generalizations of these formalisms have been applied outside of physics to the 
description of concepts (and use of these generalizations does not imply that phenomena 
at the quantum level play any role). Specifically, the noncompositional manner in which 
concepts interact can be described using formalisms that were developed to describe the 
physical phenomena of entanglement and interference. The formulae for entanglement 
were developed to describe situations of non-separability where different entities form a 
composite entity. It uses amplitudes, which are similar to probabilities, except that they 
can exhibit wave-like interference effects. Technically, the state ⎟ψ〉AB is separable if for 
the amplitudes cij amplitudes ai and bj can be found such that cij = ai bj. It is inseparable, 
and therefore an entangled state, if this is not the case, hence if the amplitudes describing 
the state of the composite entity are not of a product form. Numerous studies have shown 
that the way in which people use and interpret concept combinations can be described 
using the formalisms for entanglement, and that concept combination data sets exhibit 
constructive and destructive interference effects (Aerts, Broekaert, Gabora, & Veloz, 
2012; Aerts, Gabora & Sozzo, 2013; Aerts & Sozzo, 2011; Bruza, Kitto, Ramm, & 
Sitbon, 2011; Gabora & Aerts, 2002; Nelson & McEvoy, 2007).  
 
Conclusions and Implications for Modeling Creativity 
Creative thought exhibits some rather spectacular characteristics. First, it often 
incorporates ingredients from beyond the domain in which it is eventually expressed 
(e.g., thoughts and ideas from diverse arenas of life may be woven into the creation of a 
piece of art or music). If anything encoded in memory can potentially be recruited into a 
creative thought process, the mind requires a means of (1) finding relevant material, and 
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(2) converting it into a form in which it is amenable to expression in a different domain. 
It was suggested that the domain-specific operations of a creative act operate in service of 
this Aware-Restructure-Express (ARE) process, which not only drives creativity in the 
first place but brings about potentially therapeutic cognitive restructuring.  
Creative thought involves the forging of what we called mental wormholes: new 
associations amongst concepts and percepts that potentially come from disparate 
domains. This interaction may exhibit characteristics that make creativity challenging to 
model, such as noncompositionality, emergent properties, incorporation of outside 
knowledge, entanglement, and interference. 
By building a model of something from scratch you can put your ideas to the test 
and see how it behaves under different conditions. Numerous mathematical and 
computational models of creativity exist (e.g., Boden, 2009; Cope, 2005; DiPaola & 
Gabora, 2009; Gabora & Tseng, 2014; Gero, 2000; Thagard & Stewart, 2011; Wiggins, 
Pearce, & Müllensiefen, 2009). With rare exceptions—e.g., some models of analogy and 
metaphor—these models are restricted to a single domain (e.g., a computer model of 
musical composition that uses only musical knowledge). A single-domain model is far 
easier to construct than one that incorporates multiple domains, but because it does not 
incorporate the weaving in of cross-domain material during the ARE process, it fails to 
capture not just what fuels the creative process in the first place but the potentially 
transformative and meaningful personal impact it may have on the creator. Therefore it 
may be limited with respect to what it can tell us about how the human mind creates.  
If a model is to capture what is fundamental about the inner workings of human 
creativity it must also be able to describing the noncompositional interactions between 
concepts and percepts that lie at the heart of the creative act. Though fledgling efforts 
have been made to develop mathematical models of creativity using the quantum 
formalism described above (e.g., Gabora & Carbert, 2015; Veloz, Gabora, Eyjolfson, & 
Aerts, 2011), they have yet to be used in computer programs that generate creative 
outputs. We are on the way to accomplishing this, however, and a major leap forward in 
our understanding of creativity may lie at our doorstep.  
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